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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

- - - - - - - - - - - KELLY GRAFF and KERI
GRAFF, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.

No. 18062

BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

,H
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs-Appellants
against Defendant-Respondent seeking to invalidate a
mechanics lien filed against Plaintiffs' property.
· DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The controversy was submitted to the court on dual
motions for summary judgment.

The court granted Defendant's

motion and denied Plaintiffs' motion and accordingly ruled
that the mechanics lien was valid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
ruling and an order invalidating the mechanics lien.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed.

On November 9,

1979 defendant Boise Cascade filed a Materialmen's Notice and
Claim of Lien in the Utah County Recorder's office.

The

Notice and Claim of Lien was executed and signed by Berk
Buttars.

The Notice was contained in a printed form prepared

by Boise cascade Corporation.

(R. 8).

The lien concerned

property located in Utah County with the record title holder
being listed as Roncor, Inc.
At the time the lien was filed Plaintiffs owned the
equitable title to such property by way of an unrecorded
agreement between Roncor and Plaintiffs dated May 14, 1979.
Subsequently, in April of 1980 Plaintiffs filed notice of
their interest in the property with the Utah County Recorder.
On December 11, 1979 Boise Cascade filed a suit against
Roncor, Inc. requesting foreclosure of the various mechanics
liens against Utah County properties, including that of
Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs were not named as party-defendants

either at the commencement of suit or subsequently ±n that
action.

That lawsuit was filed in the Fourth Judicial District

Court of Utah County and was assigned to Judge Bullock as
Civil No. 53223.
On March 17, 1980 this action was originally filed in
the Third Judicial District Court.

Subsequently, Defendants

moved to dismiss the action based upon "priority of jurisdic-
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tion" claiming the Utah County suit precluded the Salt Lake

9,

t

ce and

County action.

(R. 5-13) .

After a hearing before the Third

Judicial District Court Defendant's motion was denied.

(R. 18).

On June 19, 1980 Defendants moved to change venue to

:k

Utah County.

:epared

was transferred to Utah County as Civil No. 55438.

rned
holder

(R. 20).

This motion was granted and the case

The parties filed dual motions for summary judgment
based upon the undisputed facts and upon various affidavits.
(R. 134-136; 90-92; 171-173).

On August 26, 1981 Judge David

he

Sam ruled that Defendant was in substantial compliance with

.ed

the mechanics lien law and therefore granted Defendant's
motion for summary judgment and denied the motion of Plaintiffs.

~

of

!Corder.

(R. 187-188).
is taken.

(R. 193).
ARGUMENT

tgainst

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THE
LIEN OF DEFENDANT INVALID SINCE IT
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH UTAH LAW.

:hanics

MECH.Ai~ICS

The sole question before this Court is the validity of

iants
that

It is from this order that the present appeal

the mechanics lien notice filed by Defendant on November 9,
1979.

If the notice complied with Section 38-1-7, U.C.A.,

the ruling of the lower court would be correct--however, if

: as
it failed to comply with this statute the court was in error.
Plaintiffs contended in the lower court that the notice

din
was defective because it was not properly verified and did

ndants
not contain the name of the person to whom the materials were

rigdiC'
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furnished.

The notice was printed on a form prepared by

defendant Boise Cascade Corporation.

For the convenience

of the court a copy is contained as an appendix to this Brief.
The parts of the notice which Plaintiffs claim are defective
concern the verification block and the first three lines
of the notice.
The signature block contained the words BOISE CASCADE
CORPORATION By /s/ Berk Buttars, Agent.
The verification block appeared as follows:

State

of-"4.{'"""'~.-...:t;&z.:;.,:;..;.;..i_.·_.·.·_county of----...:./L.._.:;.i.'fA.o::;....;_£..:;.,£.
..-..·_
.. · ... :

.

·.;

·.\'

-~----'----

.:·.

;

..

j; :· ._ .

Being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: that be
an ngel'_'lt of BOIS~ CASCADE CORPORATION, a corporation, · ..
the cliumnnt herein and makes this verification for and on its
behalf; that he has read the foregoing notice and claim of lien
and ~nows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true
and Just.
·~

The mechanics lien statute has been part of Utah law
since its admittance to statehood.

This Court has consistently

held that a mechanics lien is statutory and not contractual

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and that a lien cannot be acquired unless the claimant
complies strictly with the statutory provisions.

Eccles

Lumber Co. v. Martin, 87 P. 713 (Utah 1906); First Security
.Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, No. 17229, June 10, 1981 (Utah).
Section 38-1-7 U.C.A.

(the lien notice statute) has

been amended on several occasions by the Legislature but
basically has maintained the same requirements for a valid
lien as originally required in 1898.

The statute requires

that the notice of lien state, among other things, "the name
of the owner, if known, and also the name of the person by
whom he was employed or to whom he furnished the materials"
and that, the claim must "be verified by the oath of himself
or of some other person."
Courts in Utah and throughout the country have required
a lien claimant to strictly comply with notice requirements
provided by the various lien laws because of the serious
consequence such a lien can place upon the owner's property.
Justice Howe in First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra,
stated this policy as follows:
The policy underlying these decisions is sound.
A lien creates an encumbrance on property that
deprives the owner of his ability to convey clear
title and impairs his credit.
The filing of a
lien for an excessive amount could be used to
force a settlement unfairly weighted in favor of
the claimant.
Such abuse is made a misdemeanor
by Section 38-1-25. These serious consequences
justify the statutory imposition of a requirement
that one who makes the claim must furnish a sworn
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statement to the truthfulness of the facts giving
rise to it. Frivilous, unfounded, and inflated
claims can thereby be minimized, and the prejudgment property rights of the individuals
receive their due protection.
(Slip Opinion, p. 4) .
The Montana Supreme Court has also elaborated on the
requirement of verification and the test to be applied.

The

court there stated:
This extraordinary claim should not be placed
on the property of another unless the facts out of
which the lien arises are vouched for on oath by
some person who knows them to exist. . . . The
sanction of perjury insures the veracity of the
statements made by the person with knowledge.
Thus,
a test of the sufficiency of the affidavit to a
mechanics lien is whether perjury is assignable
upon the verification to it.
Saunders Cash-Way
v. Herrick, 587 P.2d 947 (Mont. 1978).
(Emphasis
added) .
See also, H.A.M.S. Co. v. Electrical Contractors of Alaska,
563 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977); Hoffman v. Palm Springs, 337
P.2d 132 (Cal. App. 1959}.
In the instant case, Mr. Buttars signed on behalf of
the corporation in the signature block.

No agent, however,

was listed as "being first duly sworn" nor did any agent
execute the line irrunediately below the oath of verification.
The oath of verification as printed on the form stated that
the person verifying the lien was an agent of Boise Cascade
Corporation, that verification was made on behalf of the
corporation, and that the person had read the foregoing notice
and claim and knew the contents and believed they were true
and just.

The "jurat" of the notary public, following the
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blank line, merely states:

"Subscribed and sworn" and then

contains the name of the notary, date, and commission information.
Plaintiffs contended in the lower court that the failure
.e

n.

:ici

of any person to actually sign the written oath and statement
contained on the Notice and Claim of Lien caused the lien to
fail since it was not "verified".

The lower court held the

signature of Buttars in the signature block substantially
complied with the verification requirement.

(R. 187-188).

The court assumed that because Buttars had signed on behalf
of the corporation in the signature block of the lien that
he was the person who would have been "first duly sworn" and
that he was the person

whom the notary described as

"subscribed and sworn".
The decision of the lower court was erroneous.

As the

notice was written there was no person described as "being
first duly sworn" nor was any signature executed following
the oath.

The verification block must be viewed separately

from the signature block since it is possible that one person
signs on behalf of the corporation but does not know the
contents to be true while another person is aware of the
true contents but is not authorized by the corporation to
file liens.
Here, the verification block states that
"being first duly sworn under oath deposes and
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says . • . . "

It is unsigned.

The jurat of the notary

states "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of
November, 1979" followed by the notary's signature.
Thus, had this been a normal affidavit it would have
been defective on its face since the reader would not know
whose affidavit was being "subscribed and sworn" to nor
would there be any signature binding the affiant.

The fact

that Buttars signed a separate portion of the lien notice is
inunaterial to the sufficiency of the verification block.
The initial Utah lien law was enacted in 1898.

At that

time it required the same elements including verification.
Section 2983 of the 1898 code provided the definition of
verification as used at that time.

It stated:

"The affidavit

of verification must state that the pleading is true to the
knowledge of the deponent.

"

The statute continued,

"When the pleading is verified by the attorney or other person,
except one of the parties, the verification must show the
reason why it is not made by a party.

"

The oath and statement contained on the lien form provided by Boise Cascade would have met
Utah law had it been executed.

the requirements of

First, it would have confirmed

that the signer was an agent of Boise Cascade Corporation
and made the verification on its behalf.

The Supreme Court of

Kansas in Ekstrom United Supply Co. v. Ash Grove Lime and Portland Cement Co., 400 P.2d 707 (Kan. 1956) invalidated a lien
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in which the oath taken by the agent of the corporation failed
to state that he was acting on behalf of the corporation.
Unless the person signing the lien claim swears that he is
authorized to act on behalf of the corporation a valid lien
verification has not been made.
Likewise, the printed oath stated that the signer "had
read the foregoing notice and knew the contents thereof and
.s

believed the same to be true and just."

It is essential

that the claimant state under oath that the charges listed in
lt

the lien were actually incurred and are correct.

Merely

stating that the form itself appears to be a correct listing
of the charges or that the charges appear to be correct

ivit

based upon information and belief is not sufficient.
Saunders Cash-Way v. Herrick, 587 P.2d 947 (Mont. 1978).
This Court has stated that an acknowledgement of mere
corporate authority is insufficient without also a sworn
statement that the charges are correct and true.
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, supra.

See

also~

First Security

H.A.M.S. Co. v.

Electrical Contractors of Alaska, 568 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1977).
The instant "Materialmen's Notice and Claim of Lien"
failed these requirements since the critical information
contained in the printed form was not executed.

There could

be no charge of perjury made against any person if the lien
notice was proven fraudulent.

The lien clearly fails to meet

the "verification" requirement of the statute since verifi-
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cation includes both the actual swearing to the truth of
the statements by the subscriber and also the certification
thereto by the notary or other officer authorized by law to
administer oaths.

71 C.J.S., Pleading, §343, p. 743.

See

also, In Re James Passero & Sons, 261 N.Y.S. 661 (N.Y. Supp.
Ct.

19 33) .
The jurat is not a part of the affidavit but is simply

a certificate of a notary that the person who executed the
signature was in fact the true person whose name appeared.
It is no part of the oath but is merely evidence of the fact
that the person appeared before the notary.

Stern v. Board of

Elections of Cuyahoga County, 23_7 N.E.2d 313 (Ohio 1968).
As such, the broad "subscribed and sworn" language used in
this document cannot of itself give rise to the requirement of
verification since the notary was not attempting to verify the
truth of the charges contained in the lien.

The jurat is

merely ancillary to the actual oath and signature of the
aff iant to verify the accuracy of the signature and to confirm
that an oath was taken.

As stated by the Supreme Court of Maine:

If a certificate of oath were not a necessary
prerequisite to the recording of the lien claim
notice and essential to its validity and the fact
that the oath had been administered could be shown
at trial, such a practice would open the door to
abuses, mischiefs, errors, and potential fraud
difficult to detect.
The temptation would be there
for witnesses, including justices of the peace,
notary publics, and attorneys involved in the
alleged administration of the oath, to activate
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doubtful memories to fit their interests.
Pineland Lumber Co. v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 33
(Me. 197 8) .
In addition, not only did the materialmen's notice
fail to state specifically the verification required by law
but the subsequent affidavit of Mr. Buttars filed on July 10,
1981 attempting to "verify that he has read said materalmen's
notice and claim of lien and knows the contents thereof and
believes the sarne to be true and just" is also deficient
since that affidavit was not notarized.

(R. 90-91).

Thus,

on both documents no charge of perjury could ever be levied
against any person since the lien was unsigned.
The affidavit of Buttars, even if it had been notarized,
would not have cured the defect.

Extrinsic evidence as to

the validity of a mechanics lien is not sufficient.

As

noted by the Kansas Supreme Court:
Plaintiff offered to show and did testify
that when the acknowledgement was made he was
sworn to the statement, but the statement filed
to constitute a lien must be complete in itself
and must show on its face all the matters which
the statute requires to be shown to create and
fix the lien. . . .
[R]eferences and evidence
outside the lien statement are not sufficient
to support a lien.
Reeves v. Kansas Coop. Wheat
Marketing Assn., 15 P.2d 446 (Kan. 1940).
In the instant case there is no sworn statement by any person
that he knew the charges of the lien and knew them to be
true and just.
As this Court is aware the form of verification is
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critical to successfully claiming a valid mechanics lien.
Numerous cases, as mentioned earlier, have struck down liens
because they have not strictly complied with the statutory
requirement of verification.

A mechanics lien, unlike a

normal affidavit, has a devastating effect in and of itself
whereas most affidavits have no effect except to assist in
an underlying purpose such as a lawsuit.
Besides the verification defect the notice states that
Boise Cascade upon the request of Boise Cascade furnished
materials comprising the subject of the lien.

The statute

requires that the person who requests the work be listed in
the lien.

This requirement is no doubt present to eliminate

any problems involved when persons other than the owner request
work to be performed.

As the form now stands it is unknown

whether the owner Roncor requested the material or whether
some other contractor, subcontractor, or person actually
entered into the agreement.

Failing to include proper names

in notices of claims have also invalidated the lien.

H &L

Supply, Inc. v. Ewing, 61 Cal. Rptr. 289 (Cal. App. 1968);
Lewis v. Midway Lumber, 568 P.2d 750 (Ct. Ariz. 1977).
This error combined with the failure to properly verify
clearly invalidates the mechanics lien notice and the decision
of the lower court is therefore erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The failure of Defendant to properly verify the lien is
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fatal to enforcement of the lien.
mere technicality with no purpose.

This requirement is not a
This deficiency is analogous

to a witness at trial testifying without having sworn to the
truth of his testimony.
no notarization appears.

It is analogous to an affidavit in which
All these procedures are designed

to impose sanctions against falsehoods and to imput the significance of the statement to the affiant.
Defendant's failure to even list who was "sworn" together
with the failure of an executed signature cannot be overcome
by arguing "substantial compliance" because the verification
in this case was not a deficiency of degree but was lacking in
total.

Likewise, the error of listing Boise Cascade as ordering

the materials from itself cannot be overcome by "substantial
compliance" since this information was statutorily required and
was simply wrong--no room for equitable adjustment exists.
The decision of the lower court should be reversed and
judgment entered on behalf of Plaintiffs.

Craig S. Cook
Attorneys for Appellants

iS
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EXHIBIT "A"
MAT'

.• '.L~!.t\.:\'S NOTICE AL'tD

CLA'.~.

r.
N9TJ'.GFJ JS HEREBY GIVEN, that BOISE CASCADE CORPGRATJ.0.N, Claimant herein, at
· th~ '"'rc~uest of
Boise Cascade: Corrorntion
EA?,l."U. Ti\i !~'.~:'.

did on the

2nd

day of

..:t.:..:h.;;;.em=-_ _.,_·'-·~rid at
them

until the

Augu

,

19...1.L, begin to sell, furnish and deliver material~ to

their

request did continue to sell, furnish and deliver building materials to_

4th

dar of

Seotember

, 19..1..L, which was the last day on which.

:mi<l materials were so sold, furnished and delivered, to he used f o r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Cons trucc ion of a new house

,

.

upon the following described lands, to-wit:
:

:,:·:
i··::

Harbor Park Subdivision, Plat A, Lot #29.

The building materials so sold, furnished and delivered were used in the construction and/or alteration<;.

and repair of the huilding(s) and improvements above mentioned.
The narne(s) of the owner(s) and reputed owner(s) of the lands, building(s) and improvements to be
charged with the lien is/ are_ _..;R:.;.;o~n:.;.;c~o:;..;r:-..;I::..:n.:..:c:..:o::.:r:.::D::.::O::.:r:.::a::..::t:.::e:.:::d~-~H~e=-=r--=i..,.t...s:a~Q:;.loie,__.P...r.r..i.oi.pp!!;;,,.w.r...r.t~y;....i..C""au.m~p.1.1;;au.n~y.___ _ _ _ _ __

______________________________________ ______

,,..;..,

..;._

The building materials so sold, furnished and delivered amounted in value to the sum of_______·---- - :.:One thousand one hundred fiftv one dollars 64/100--------------- D~llars ($ J J 51 6'•

),,:~:?

and no part of this amount has been paid and there are no just credits or offsets e:<cep..__________._.-_
_ _N_~o_n_e_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--.J.Jollara ($---·""'O""-=-->·
~.

·-1'

There is a balance due and unpaid for such materials to this claimant over and above all just credits ancl:.,_:-l
offsets of One thousand one hundred fifty one dollars 64/100-------flollars ($ 11 51 64
)";·: -~
for which last named sum BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION claims a lien upon the sai

<;

·

_ _n_e_w_l...:y:-c_o_n_s_t_r_u_c_t_e..;d;.....;;h;..;;o..;u;..;;s;..;e~------------------aand the lands above describ~d . .· :(
day of_-~N~o"-ly~eo:.!m.!.l;b~e:.i,r_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __, 1~1.L
Dated at._ __.:.O,._re:::.:m:.:.·~U::.:t::.:.a...:.h,.____ , the 8th
~ CASCADE CORPORATION.

For Recorder's Use
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Being first dul;• sworn upon oath deposes and snys: thnt h~ is
an 11.gent of BOISE CASCADE COP. :'CIRA TION, n corno~tfon.,
the cl:limnnt herein nnd m:1i:<:?a t:!!s ,·-:~:!!,·~tbn. fo:- l!nd on i~~
beh::i'i; th:it he has tc:iJ the fo::-c:7:·:~·7 notice ~n.d dnil':l of lh':i
and \mows the contc>nts thereof 1w,i k· :i~n:i tr.C? sr.rni:? to Ile t:"'.!('
nntl jul!t.
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